Introduction
The provision of ecosystem services and biodiversity conservation may be seen in some environments as a process of accumulating and maintaining the natural capital assets that support ecosystem service (ES) output. It is an investment decision that requires diverting land, labour and man-made capital to appreciate an ecosystem asset, which in turn provides an ES output. For instance, in the case study discussed later in this paper, the ecosystem asset is an area of endangered Australian native vegetation that hosts unique biodiversity but also provides ecosystem services including regulating saline ground water and reducing soil erosion. Without sufficient land and effort allocated to its protection, the state of native vegetation depreciates. If the vegetation remnant is recruited into a conservation management scheme then both the area and its condition can appreciate, increasing the shadow value of this asset. The definition of an ES used here is consistent with Bateman et al (2011 ), Barbier (2009 and Mäler et al. (2009) . To quote Bateman et al. (2011, p180) 
"the level of ecosystem service 'harvested' within any given period can be thought of as a 'flow' extracted from an underlying 'stock' of ecosystem asset….".
The process described is characterised by the flowchart in Figure 1 . A land area has an ecosystem asset of a given state as measured by a metric. This is combined with input factors land and conservation effort, and through an ecosystem asset change process provides an ES output. The process is dynamic, since the ecosystem asset changes through time. Contracting with owners and/or managers of the asset can be used at a number of stages in this process: such contracts can specify the inputs employed by the land manager, the state of the ecosystem asset, or the ES output. A contract can specify these variables directly as a requirement for a specific quantity supplied, or can incentivise their supply through prices paid to the land manager or owner. In the economic model developed in Section 3, this relationship is simplified so that the value of the ES output is a simple linear function of the state of the ecosystem asset. Inputs change the ecosystem asset's condition over time.
Note: the diagram indicates input decisions with a diamond; a state variable (ecosystem asset) with a rhomboid, a process (the ecosystem change process) with a rectangle and a flow variable ecosystem services as round-cornered rectangle.

Figure 1 Conceptual model linking ecosystem outputs, inputs and assets
Since the objective of Payment for Ecosystem Service (PES) schemes is to increase the ES output, an obvious question is whether payments should be targeted at outputs (such as better water quality) rather than at the management inputs or actions which change ES outputs (such as changes in fertiliser use: Hanley et al., 2012) . Most current agri-environmental policy in the European Union is targeted at management actions or inputs, typically because these are thought easier to observe, and because the ES output from a given area of land is determined by a wide range of factors, only some of which are under the direct control of the landowner.
This means that output-based contracts are often riskier for the landowner than input-based contracts (Burton and Schwarz, 2013) . Moreover, it may be more expensive for the regulator to monitor ES outputs or ecosystem assets compared to inputs. 4 However, output-based payments have advantages (Gibbons et al., 2011) . For instance, if essential inputs are hidden (or expensive for the regulator to observe), then paying for outputs may be more efficient. Moreover, farmers may hold private information on the best methods for investing in the ecosystem asset and producing the ES: these cannot be easily specified in an actions-based contract. Output-based payments encourage land managers to make use of this information to produce ES outputs.
One economic approach to the design of voluntary agri-environmental schemes is based around mechanism design, structuring contracts to induce a dominant-strategy Bayesian equilibrium in games of incomplete information (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) . This mechanism is applied to define a menu of contracts that is designed to separate "types" of supplier by voluntary selfselection, as a means of reducing information rents. We follow this approach in the model set out in section 3.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review.
Section 3 presents the models. The first subsection gives the derivation of the compliance cost.
The next sets out the first-best perfect information solution. The hidden information contracting problem is analysed using input, output and mixed contracts. An alternative price-based contract is then analysed which is characterised as one approach to overcoming moral hazard.
Moral hazard is also addressed directly as a problem of allocating monitoring resources. The last subsection considers the input-based contract over two periods with the possibility of recontracting. Section 4 gives an empirical example. Section 5 concludes and identifies areas for further research. Weitzman (1974, p477) stated that the "..average economist in the Western marginalist tradition has at least a vague preference toward indirect control by prices, just as the typical non-economist leans toward the direct regulation of quantities." . He demonstrates an equivalence, under certain restrictive assumptions, between setting the price of a good or service and leaving the firm to maximize profit by adjusting output; or fixing output and leaving the firm to minimize costs. He then states that any advantage of one policy over another must " be due to inadequate information or uncertainty." This paper, along with the literature on procurement and contracting (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Laffont and Martimort, 2002 ) has led to a number of papers applying mechanism design to agri-environmental polices (Wu and Babcock, 1996 and Moxey et al., 1999; Ferraro, 2008; Hanley et al., 2012 and Miteva et al., (2012) .
Literature Review
Recent papers that have specifically looked at the optimal selection of alternative policy mechanisms include Melkonyan and Taylor (2013) . They show in relation to policy for US ranchland that, given informational asymmetries between ranchers and regulators, outcomebased payments are a first-best policy when regulators can perfectly monitor the ecological condition of the ranch. Where monitoring is imperfect, input regulation and cost-sharing or taxation may dominate performance regulation. Anthon et al. (2010) consider the optimal design of PES-type contracts to private landowners under asymmetric information. They find foresters who are likely to achieve a higher level of conservation should be offered outputbased contracts. Derissen and Quaas (2013) extend a model by Zabel and Roe (2009) to develop a mixed output-based and input-based contracting approach to a problem where the farmer is better informed about environmental performance than the regulator. Their model addresses asymmetric information relating to the marginal productivity of the "ecosystem production function". Under such conditions, they show that a mixed contract on inputs and output is preferred.
Dynamic contracting, commitment and renegotiation is critical to the long term protection of ecosystem assets, as positive change is often gradual and degradation rapid and irreversible.
However, there has been a limited application of principal-agent models from general economics Tirole, 1988, 1990) to long term contracting for ecosystem services.
The key issues in this literature Salanie, 1990 and 1996) are the role of commitment by the regulator to set up separating contracts and the use of spot contracts as alternatives to long term contracts. The contribution of this paper is to take a general procurement model due to Laffont and Tirole (1993) and modify it in a way that relates more closely to the realities of ES output contracts. In particular, we consider a situation in which there are two inputs and a single ES output related by an ecosystem production function. Further, the farmer is represented as investing in an ecosystem asset as essential input into ES output. These 6 generalisations allow us to explore the role of differentiated transactions costs related to the monitoring of contract variables. These issues are reviewed by reference initially to a twotype static model, and then to a two-period, two-type dynamic model.
The Model
This section sets up a general agri-environmental contract for providing ecosystem services, and then explores aspects of the model to assess when payment for ecosystem output or payment for ecosystem inputs is optimal. Assume that there are just two representative farmer types that are able to provide an ES, the supply of which depends on how land is managed in a region. These farmer types differ according to their agricultural productivity, information on which may be hidden from the regulator. Thus, there is hidden variation in the opportunity costs of providing ecosystem inputs since the ES output requires the sacrifice of inputs used to produce profitable crops. Farmers combine land and effort to invest in an ecosystem asset that in turn provides an ES output. The benefits can be measured as an ecosystem metric, where the changes in the metric can then be valued. The contract timing for a general problem, including repeated contracting, is given in Figure 2 .
Aspects of the standard model that are explored here include the number of inputs, farm types and information. The standard principal-agent model for procurement, for instance Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 3) , typically has a single input variable "effort". This simplification is questionable when there are multiple inputs used to produce an ES. In our model set-up, one input is cheaply observableand another is not. If there are two inputs, then the farm's type may relate to land or effort productivity, the cost of producing ES output, or behavioural parameters such as risk aversion and time preference. The standard model does not include the possibility that the regulator could select to monitor another variable -such as ES output -as a way of improving the cost effectiveness of a contract.
Figure 2 Contract timings
Compliance costs
The costs of engaging in providing an ecosystem service are internal to the farm business in the sense that the farmer allocates resources such as land and effort to maintain the ecosystem asset. To represent this, we define a restricted profit function (Lau, 1976) 
Cost functions are strictly increasing in the type parameters.
General contracting problem
This section sets up the general contracting problem as a basis for considering the potential for different contract designs. The risk neutral regulator maximises a social welfare function: 
The term t  is the discount factor for period t and accounts for the cost of raising tax revenue due to the deadweight loss of taxation (Campbell and Bond, 1997) .
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Assuming compliance so that the problem for the farmer is deterministic, the farmer's objective function is 
The profit to the farmer when they truthfully reveal their type is indicated by the subscripts ii.
The participation constraint is:
where i J is the farm's reservation profit. The incentive compatibility constraint is:
The first subscript is the farm's type whilst the second subscript is the farm's declared type when selecting from a menu of contracts. The regulator acts as a Stackelberg leader (Baron, 1985) in optimizing (3) constrained by (4), (5) and (6). In the analysis we start with a simple model and develop a set of results for aspects of the general model.
Static first-best input and output-based contracts
Assumptions A1. The regulator maximizes the social-welfare function, and is risk neutral. If the regulator contracts on effort and land allocated to ES output, they maximize:
Maximum vg x e c e c
subject to the individual rationality or participation constraint:
The optimal internal solution is:
The shadow cost of public funds increases the marginal cost of input allocations. The firstbest policy is least cost as (9) implies the condition for cost minimization:
If instead the regulator contracts only on ES output i y , the firm, as the residual claimant, produces the contracted output at a minimum cost. Define a cost function as:
where z is a vector of inputs in the ES and
is a convex input requirement set for the ES output and [ , ] ex ii
The modified objective function for the regulator is:
and the participation constraints:
The shadow cost of public funds,  , increases the marginal cost of the ES output. The inputbased and outcome-based contracts are identical as, by definition, the cost function (11) implies cost minimization
The input-based contract is also cost minimizing as (10) implies a cost minimizing solution.
The first-best contracts are illustrated in Figure 3 . The regulator would offer the low-cost farm type (l-type) the contract at a as either an input-based or an outcome-based contract, and the high-cost farm type (h-type) the contract at b. For an input contract the regulator, as the residual claimant, sets the contracted levels of effort and land to minimize the transfer payment related to a level of output and thus maximize the social welfare function. For the output contract. farmers as residual claimants select the cost minimizing levels of input to maximize their profit. The objective function is modified to give the expected social welfare function: 
By assumption rent for the h-type farmer is zero and from the binding (IC-l): 
On this basis the optimal internal solution gives two first-order conditions, the first for the ltype:
(1 ) ( , ); (1 ) ( , ) 
(thus the l-type is offered the first-best solution) and the second for the h-type: 
The second term on the right-hand side of the first-order condition for land is positive by assumption and measures the marginal information rents associated with increasing the input requirements in the contract for the h-type. This term also means that the input requirement is no longer resource cost minimizing for the given ES output: 
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This indicates that the land to effort ratio for the h-type is reduced due to the additional marginal information rent.
Result 2 The l-type is offered the first best input level, but is paid an information rent in excess of the compliance cost. The h-type is offered a contract with a lower level of land and effort,
and their information rent is zero.
Adverse selection with an output-based contract
Assumption A3. As for A2 except the regulator contracts on the ES output.
From an output contract perspective, the problem is re-stated as follows:
Subject to the individual rationality constraint:
and incentive compatibility constraints:
The first order condition for the l-type is:
For the h-type the output is reduced compared to the first-best:
)
The first-order condition above establishes a point of difference between input-based and output-based contracts. Condition (24) 
The objective function (26) is maximised subject to participation constraints:
2 The existence of this function is easily shown for the production function 
and incentive compatibility constraints: 
The results given in Appendix 2 show that this result is equivalent to the optimal input-based solution. The approach of contracting on variables that are more readily observable can be generalised to other contract settings, but depends on the existence of the function ˆ( , )
that relates observable variables to unobservable ones. An equivalent version of this result can be derived for the case where the land type is the same, but the effort type is differentiated between producers. This follows as the result does not rely on the observability of effort, only the fact that the verifiable land and output uniquely determine effort.
Result 4. A mixed contract on output and land is equivalent to the optimal input-based solution to the adverse selection problem.
A short discussion about possible generalisations of this result is warranted. For a contract to be viable, the regulator must be able to contract on sufficient variables, with active monitoring if required, to ensure production of the ecosystem service. Thus, an input contract is not viable if one essential input is not observable or contractible. In contrast, if an ES output is observable and the contract is based on outputs, this does not depend on input observability as the agent as residual claimant has an incentive to produce the contracted output at least cost.
Settings where the extra information rent for a third-best output-based contract is relatively low and the transaction cost of observing inputs is higher than for output, favours outputbased contracts.
In adverse selection models with two inputs the hidden type parameter could apply to land or effort productivity or both. In a two-type per input or continuous type setting this would be difficult to analyse. For instance, the two-type model has four types and simplifying results are not readily available. In contrast, depending on the functional forms of cost and production function, it may be possible to construct an aggregate type that accounts for differences in both land and effort productivity. (Mas-coll et al. 1995, p142) , which is the standard derivation of a cost function from a production function.
Moral hazard
Assumption A5. As in A2, except that effort is costly to monitor and the regulator can penalize the agent for the level of non-compliance (shirking).
If a contracted input is unobservable without the regulator engaging in costly monitoring then this creates a moral hazard problem, as the farm may shirk on the contracted level of input use. Within the model developed here, two approaches emerge for dealing with moral hazard; either direct monitoring with penalties, or mixed contracts where the contract specifies "costly-to-fake" variables such as ES output and land use. These are sufficient to ensure an optimal level of the unobservable variable. If, for instance, ES output is costly to measure, then the regulator may have to monitor effort directly and use an input-based contract. The effectiveness of monitoring depends on the capacity of the regulator to charge a fine for applying less effort than contracted (White, 2002) 
The penalty function is defined as follows: 
The objective function (29) is maximised subject above constraint, the IR-h (8) and the IC-l (16) constraints. The first order condition for effort is: 
Notably, the monitoring term is strictly positive and increases the marginal cost of effort.
Relative to the solution, given by (19), monitoring reduces the land to effort ratio: 
Result 5. The regulator monitoring contract is less cost-effective than either the input-based or mixed contract, as the second term on the right-hand side of (32) reduces the optimal effort
to land ratio.
Price-based contracts
Assumption A6. The regulator observes farm types and offers each a price contract based on the ES output. The regulator does not contract directly on inputs or output. The output depends upon the farmer's supply response for ES output. The regulator is able to observe ES output as a basis of determining the payment.
A perfect information price contract is where the regulator acts as a price discriminating monopsony and has perfect information about types. The regulator's objective function is:
subject to:
The first-order conditions are:
(1 (1 ( ) )) ( , ) y ( )
where ( . Thus the transfer payment for a given output is higher under a price-based contract than under an output scheme.
Assumption A7. The same as A6 except that the regulator does not observe type and offers all types a single price.
If only a single price is offered to both producers, then the optimal solution is:
This is equivalent to (36) except that in each case the expected terms for marginal cost, output and the marginal ecosystem output are substituted. Dynamic contracting in a two-period setting lacks a general solution (Rey and Salanie, 1996) .
Result 6. In a first-best price based contract compared to a first-best input contract the ES
A key issue with dynamic contracts is time (in)consistency, in that farmers have incentives to not reveal their type due to a concern that the information will disadvantage the agent during renegotiation. Separating contracts may not be incentive compatible if farmers expect the regulator to use the information to 'ratchet-up' the efficiency required on the basis of the information on type (MacKenzie et al, 2008) . Further attempts to separate out the l-type by providing extra rent in the first period may lead to the h-type selecting the contract intended for the l-type and following a 'take-the-money-and-run' strategy (Laffont and Tirole, 1988) .
One approach to this problem is to offer a single pooled contract, but this might significantly reduce cost effectiveness. The alternative explored here and in the case study is for the regulator to commit to honour the separating contract over both periods, but negotiate Paretoimproving terms in the second period based on the revealed information. The general form of the model is due to Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 2) . The difference with their model is that farmers are investing in an ecosystem asset so that the problem changes through time.
Commitment by the regulator is critical for investment in ecosystem assets as it can prevent incentives that could arise for farmers to first invest in the ecosystem asset and then subsequently dis-invest. Contracting with commitment is viewed as a process of managing the ecosystem asset in a transition towards equilibrium where the agent's type is known and they are paid in a long term contract to maintain the equilibrium. At this stage the regulator may offer the agent a covenant to permanently protect the asset. In this section we explore this transition towards equilibrium.
The regulator's objective function over two periods is: 
This is optimised subject to the participation constraints: 
and the incentive compatibility constraints: 
The first-order conditions are derived on the basis that the individual rationality constraint for the h-type and the incentive compatible constraint for the l-type are binding. The effort conditions are the same for both types: 
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Effort in the first period increases the ecosystem asset in the first and second period. In common with the static solution (17) and (18) the optimal land allocation for the low cost type is the first-best:
The h-type marginal condition includes two informational rents one for each period:
Embedded in this problem is an issue of the length of contracts and the duration of each stage.
The regulator may make the first period short so that the performance of firms can be observed, possibly by active output monitoring (White, 2005) , and the second period longer as the regulator offers the farms revised Pareto improving contracts. 
A case study
The south-west corner of Western Australia is designated by Conservation International as a Biodiversity Hotspot (Myers et al., 2000) . This designation indicates a region of high endemic plant biodiversity, and yet one which is under a high level of threat from agriculture.
For instance, the NEWROC (Northeast Wheatbelt Regional Organisation of Councils) region has only around 12% of its indigenous, native vegetation remaining. The role of input and output based agri-environmental schemes in protecting this ecosystem and the characteristics of the study region is described in detail by White and Sadler (2012) .
The remaining biodiversity in the region is found in remnant woodland, shrub and mallee heath, collectively termed "bush remnants". The threats to biodiversity include land clearing for cereal and sheep production (although further clearing is banned), the encroachment of agricultural weeds, and sheep grazing. Management practices include excluding sheep through fencing, weeding and replanting. The regulator (the Western Australian Department of Parks and Wildlife) can identify the area of land that is fenced and included in a conservation scheme at low cost. However, other conservation efforts by the farmer are almost impossible to observe and record in a way that is legally enforceable. Similarly, the management of sheep grazing is difficult to observe at the individual farm. The opportunity cost of the labour element of conservation effort is difficult to observe and highly variable (White and Sadler, 2012) . This is a region where land sparing rather than land sharing (Balmford et al, 2012) is the best strategy, as the ecosystem benefits are relatively low on land planted to crops or used for grazing.
The nature of the ecosystem services provided by remnant bush is complex. It includes biodiversity conservation, sequesting carbon and reducing the rate of dryland salinity spread.
The social value of these components is likely to be context specific and highly variable.
Non-market valuation of biodiversity protection for Western Australia have indicated high values and shows that the Western Australian population has some awareness of the diversity of flowering plants in such areas (Burton et al., 2012) . Ecosystem output measurement is feasible and reasonably inexpensive if it is undertaken by remote sensing either through aerial photographs or satellite data. In contrast, field surveys of ecological condition, due to the remoteness of the region, are costly. As the authors show, a bush condition metric (crudely a measure of tree and understorey) is highly variable. This is partly due to the Western Australian environment which is prone to droughts and fires. Therefore risk aversion is potentially an issue for outcome-based payment schemes. The farms are large with an average size of farms surveyed 6593ha with a high level of capital investment and low level of labour. Despite their large size, most farms employ only one person and can be 24 categorized as family farms. The duration of ecosystem service contracts is important. Any change in the bush management would probably take about three years to take effect, with a significant change after six to ten years (Prober and Smith, 2009 ). There is a distinct possibility that the bush could deteriorate if there is sub-optimal effort. We use this system to show the relative properties of the contract types described in Section 3, based on the simulation modelling reported in White and Sadler (op cit). Table 2 here Table 1 shows parameter values and functional forms. The results in Table 2 show that where there is perfect information the regulator can achieve the same level of efficiency with an input contract (contract 1) and an output contract (contract 3). In the case of hidden land productivity, an input contract (contract 2) is slightly more efficient than an output contract (contract 4). Mixed contracts (contract 5) which target land and output are as efficient at addressing adverse selection as an input contract and can also induce a farmer to supply an optimal level of effort. This is an interesting result that holds trivially for the case of two inputs but in more complex policy settings may suggest that regulators should consider targeting more observable variables, which then provides an indirect incentive to manage inputs that are unobservable.
Table 3 here
First best price contracts (contract 6) and single price contracts (contract 7) are less efficient than contracts 1 through to 5. This is due to the shadow cost of taxation and the producer surplus (rent). These two contracts raise an issue about whether in the long term it is better to allow farmers to profit from providing ecosystem services much in the same way as they profit from providing market goods. From a cost-effectiveness viewpoint, most attention has been on devising agri-environment schemes which extract all rent from participants, but this might not always be the best long-run option. Note also that a pricing approach would place an emphasis upon the ability of the regulator to estimate the non-market and market values of ES outputs as the price should be set relative to the ES value. Table 3 gives results for the two-period input-based commitment model. The first-best solution (contract 9) provides a benchmark. Notice that the inputs increase in period two as the increase in the ecosystem asset raises their marginal products. The mechanism design solution (contract 10) reduces land and effort input for the high cost type. The renegotiation proof contract (contract 11) offers the mechanism design menu for both periods in the first period, but also implies that any renegotiation in the second cannot make farmers worse off.
The solution shows that there is a modest increase in social welfare from this contract relative to the mechanism design contract. The rent of the l-type farmer is the same as that for mechanism design and the high cost type switches to a first best level of land and effort given the ecosystem asset at the end of the first period. It is for this reason that the input levels are slightly less than for the first best.
Conclusions
In their assessment of European agri-environmental policy the European Court of Auditors This paper identified a series of results that offer insights into the problems inherent in such a policy design process. First, with perfect information about farm type, the regulator is indifferent between offering an input-based or output-based contract. However, we know that such observability is unlikely to describe many (any) real-world situations. The next key finding extends a result by Khalil and Lawaree (1995) to the case where there are two inputs (one observable by the regulator and the other not) and shows that there is an efficiency gain from using input-based contracts to address adverse selection. This result hinges on the ability of the regulator to minimize the informational rent by adjusting the effort to land ratio away from the cost minimizing solution. The next result shows that if the regulator is able to measure the ES output and contract on it, then they can provide an incentive for an optimal level of the unobservable effort and informational rent. Result 4 shows that contracting on output eliminates the requirement for explicit effort monitoring.
A price-based contract that pays on ES output is attractive in terms of its administrative requirement as it only requires output monitoring. However, fixed price contracts are relatively costly to the regulator as they pay more rent to farmers Armsworth et al, 2012) .
Results for multi-period adverse selection and renegotiation are complex and are approached here by assuming regulator commitment and only allowing Pareto improving renegotiation in the second period. This is appropriate in many contracts for ecosystem services, such as the native bush example, where significant gains to society derive from long term protection.
Spot contracting, especially where paying on inputs only, is usually not optimal as it can lead to cycles of ecosystem asset appreciation and depreciation if there are gaps in the contract (Iossa and Rey, 2015) . The practical implications of the results here are that in a multi-period contract setting, even if the contracts are on inputs, it is advisable to measure output as well as imposing an additional condition for recontracting. The duration of the contract stages is also important. There may be a case for a short initial period (say 3 years in the empirical example described above) that allows the farmer to signal to the regulator their type before the regulator engages in Pareto improving renegotiation. This renegotiation sets up a long term contract (over 10 years, for instance) with a condition on renegotiation at the end of the second period.
The farmer can be seen as making a sunk investment in the ecosystem asset that provides future ecosystem services. If the farmer continues to own the asset, and on the basis that only the regulator is prepared to pay for a public good, there is the danger to the farmer of the regulator withdrawing support and the farmer not receiving a return on investment, similarly society may not benefit from the investment if the farmer does not continue to participate.
These issues strays into the domain of incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore, 1990; Tirole, 1999) and is a question for further research.
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Our results have been obtained by analysis of simplified models combined with a simulation of an actual policy setting. There are limitations to this approach and there is a requirement for further research into more complex settings, especially those relating to repeated contracting and end-of-contact problems (Kuhfuss et al, 2015) and contracting with groups of agents (Herzfeld and Jongeneel, 2012) . 
Cost of full monitoring $1000
Note: Unless otherwise stated parameters taken from White and Sadler, (2012) Burton et al (2012, p7) 
